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CASE NOTES
ion.17 Other courts have allowed the wife recovery where the injury to
her husband was intentional18 but have generally proceeded on the basis
of exemplary damages due to the character of the defendant's act.19
The reasoning of the instant case aligns itself with three recent deci-
sions20 in holding that any change in precedent should come from the
legislature. This view, which was also taken by an Illinois court 2 1 fails to
acknowledge a principle of the common law which gives a remedy wher-
ever a right is violated. Consortium is a valuable property right which
does not stand on subrogation but arises directly from the tort.22 Although
there is an almost total lack of precedent in the recognition of this right in
negligence cases, the Supreme Court of Iowa recently reasoned:
We deem precedent to be worthy of support only when it can stand the
scrutiny of logic and sound reasoning in the light of present day standards and
ideals.2'
The concepts to which the courts have reverted in denying a wife
recovery for the loss of the consortium of her husband seem to be un-
sound as well as antiquated. Since a husband and wife have mutual rights
and obligations in the marriage relation, if one has a remedy for the inva-
sion of a co-existent right, the other should have the same remedy.
17 Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E. 2d 611 (1945); Martin v.
United Electric Ry., 71 R.I. 137, 42 A. 2d 897 (1945); Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co.,
184 Mich. 304, 151 N.W. 724 (1915); Marri v. Stamford Street Ry. Co., 84 Conn. 9, 78
At. 582 (1911); Bolger v. Boston Elevated RR. Co., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910).
18 Actions for alienation of affections, criminal conversation and selling habit-forming
drugs to the spouse are included within this group.
19 Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925); Cravens v.
Louisville & Nash. RR. Co., 195 Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922).
20 Hartman v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 77 N.W. 2d 651 (Minn., 1956); Nickel v.
Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 269 Wis. 647, 70 N.W. 2d 205 (1955); Ripley v. Ewell,
61 So. 2d 420 (Fla., 1952).
21 Patelski v. Snyder, 179 I1. App. 24 (1913).
22 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F. 2d 811 (App. D.C., 1950).
23 Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W. 480 (1957).
DRAMSHOPS ACT-WIFE PERMITTED TO RECOVER DAM-
AGES FOR LOSS OF SUPPORT AS CONSEQUENCE OF IN-
TOXICATION AND DEATH OF HUSBAND WHOM SHE
SHOT IN SELF-DEFENSE
Decedent was a habitual drunkard who, while under the influence of
liquor, would become abusive to his wife, the plaintiff, beating her, and
threatening her on occasion with a knife. He had been drinking heavily
for about ten days when plaintiff went to defendants' liquor store and
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tried to induce decedent to return home. Decedent refused, but did arrive
home later, at which time he beat plaintiff. The next morning, he at-
tempted to strangle his wife. She found a gun, loaded it and hid it, and
then declared she would go with her husband if he left the house for more
whiskey. The husband threatened to kill plaintiff and approached her in a
menacing manner, whereupon she took the gun which she had hidden and
killed him. She -brought action against the liquor vendors, under the
Dramshops Act, to recover damages for loss of support as consequence of
the intoxication and death of her husband. Defendants claimed that this
would be giving plaintiff a reward for shooting her husband. Verdict and
judgment were for the plaintiff in the sum of $10,000. Kirulik v. Cohen, 16
Ill. App. 2d 385, 148 N.E. 2d 607 (1958).
The Dramshops Act of 1949 states:
Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other person, who
shall be injured, in person or in property, or means of support, by an intoxi-
cated person, or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of
any person, shall have a right of action in his or her own name, severally or
jointly, against any person or persons who shall, by selling or giving alcoholic
liquor, have caused the intoxication, in whole or in part, of such persons .... I
The liability for damages by the sale of intoxicating liquors is purely
statutory. It was not a tort at common law to sell or give intoxicating
liquors to an able-bodied individual. 2 However, it is the public policy of
Illinois, expressed by legislative act:
He who deliberately sells that which he knows will ... deprive the party of
the control of his judgment, and render him, for the time being, incapable of
exercising proper care for personal safety, or that of his propety, must be
prepared for the consequences that may follow.3
The definition and application of the phrase "in consequence of the in-
toxication" forms the subject matter of a great many of the Dramshops
Act cases. 4 Illinois courts have ruled that, in order for one to be liable un-
1 Il. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 43, § 135. Since the death occurred in 1949, that statute is
applicable. The 1957 statute provides the same in the following words: ".... An action
shall lie for injuries to means of support caused by an intoxicated person, or in conse-
quence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, resulting as aforesaid."
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 43, S 135.
2 Cruse v. Aden, 127 111. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889), aff'g 21 111. App. 391 (1887); Fourt v.
DeLazzer, 348 Ill. App. 191, 108 N.E.2d 599 (1952); Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 83
N.E.2d 708 (1949), aff'g 334 111. App. 512, 79 N.E.2d 864 (1948); Manthei v. Heimer-
dinger, 332 Ill. App. 335, 75 N.E.2d 132 (1947); Hyba v. C. A. Horneman, Inc., 302 IIl.
App. 143, 23 N.E.2d 564 (1939).
3 Emory v. Addis, 71111. 273, 277 (1874). Accord: Kennedy v. Whittaker, 81 IMl. App.
605 (1898).
4 In writing from this limited viewpoint, there is the danger that other essentials of a
Dramshops Act case will be overlooked. Thus, it is well to remember that, "Under the
statute, it was necessary for her [the wife] to satisfactorily establish, first, that the de-
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der this statute which public policy has dictated, the sale of intoxicating
liquor must be at least a contributing proximate cause of the loss or in-
jury.5 But between this cause and the final effect arise many occurrences
and agents (human and otherwise) which appear to challenge the logical
ability of the courts.6 In Haw v. 1933 Grill, Inc., the court resolved the
problem of an intervening human agent thusly:
While we have a third party, defendant's floor manager, inflicting the injury
in this case, the defendant must be presumed to have foreseen that its act of
selling the liquor to Haw might have produced or been followed by the alter-
cation in which he was injured. In view of the natural and logical sequence of
the events leading up to Haw's injury and the fact that Belmont would not
have struck him except for the manner in which he conducted himself as a
result of his intoxicated condition, in our opinion such intoxication was a con-
tributing factor and at least a proximate cause of the injury.7
In other words, it is not intended that the intoxicating liquor alone, ex-
clusive of other agency, should do the whole injury." But, on the other
hand, the Act was not
[i]ntended to require them [the liquor vendors] to anticipate every personal
injury that might occur, even an assault by a person with whose wife the in-
toxicant has been carrying on an illicit affair, providing, of course, the latter
did not provoke the assault by reason of his being intoxicated. The line must
be drawn somewhere, for the Statute obviously does not impose absolute lia-
bility or make the dramshop owner responsible for every injury incurred by
a person to whom he sells liquor.9
fendants sold or gave to the deceased intoxicating liquors; second, that the giving or
selling of such liquors caused, in whole or in part, his intoxication; third, that such in-
toxication caused his death; and fourth, that by reason of his death the plaintiff was
injured in her means of support." Flynn v. Fogarty, 106 Ill. 263, 266 (1883).
5 New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Gerin, 9 I11. App.2d 545, 133 NE.2d 723 (1956);
Hill v. Alexander, 321 I11. App. 406,53 N.E.2d 307 (1944).
6That is, it falls upon the court (ordinarily upon the jury as a question of fact) to
determine whether such occurrence or agent is an intervening, eicient cause, which
cause is "... . a new and independent force, the intervention of which was not probable
or foreseeable by first wrongdoer, which breaks causal connection between original
wrong and injury and itself becomes direct and immediate cause of injury, and inter-
vention of an independent, concurrent, or intervening force will not break causal con-
nection if intervention of such force was itself probable or foreseeable, and in such
case the earlier act, if it contributed to injury, may be regarded as a proximate cause."
Danhof v. Osborne, 10 Il1. App.2d 529, 530, 135 N.E.2d 492, 493 (1956).
7 Haw v. 1933 Grill, Inc., 297 Ill. App. 37, 46, 17 N.E.2d 70,74 (1938). Consult: Casey
v. Bums, 7 Il. App.2d 316, 129 N.E.2d 440 (1955), where it was decided that an inter-
vening and unforeseeable agency consisting of the wilful and malicious act of someone
else was not the proximate cause of injury.
s "The statute was designed for a practical end, to give a substantial remedy, and
should be allowed to have effect according to its natural and obvious meaning." Klopp
v. B.P.O.E., Lodge #281, 309 Ill. App. 145, 150, 33 N.E.2d 161, 164 (1941).
9 Danhof v. Osborne, 11 Ill.2d 77, 84, 142 N.E.2d 20, 24 (1957), rev'g 10 111. App.2d
529, 135 N.E.2d 492 (1956).
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If there is a clear-cut case of an intoxicated person being killed by light-
ning, or by assault of a highwayman or burglar, or by other means which
have no logical relation to the drinking, intoxication cannot be the proxi-
mate cause.10 Just what is a logical result has provoked great controversy.
At times, the intoxicant's inability to act has been the vital link in the
chain of consequences joining cause and effect. In Smith v. People,'1
decedent was killed when the fastenings of a wagon in which he was sit-
ting came loose from the whippletrees to which they were tied and the
team ran away. It was decided that intoxication could be the proximate
cause of death, since if decedent had been sober, he might have been able
to prevent the runaway in spite of the fright of the horses. In much the
same vein, Triggs v. McIntyre12 presents the decision that where deceased,
while unconscious as a result of intoxication, was unable to change his
position to allow the passage of air into his lungs, suffocation was the
result of intoxication.
At other times, positive actions on intoxicant's part have come into
play. It was held in Darley v. Donahue'3 that taunting and malignant ges-
tures on the part of plaintiff, who was then struck by an intoxicated per-
son did not justify that person in striking plaintiff, and therefore intoxi-
cation was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
A few Illinois decisions indicate weariness of the technical jargon in-
volved in the phrase "proximate cause" or as it is sometimes called, "con-
tributing proximate cause." In attempting to simplify matters, they have
ruled specially on cases of loss of support to wife and children. Having
done away with all adjectives, they have retained only the word "cause,"
whether the jury would consider it a proximate or a remote cause.14
No matter what the actual wordage used by the courts in jury instruc-
tions they are simply calling for an investigation of occurrences, beginning
with the intoxication and ending with the loss or damage upon which suit
is based. The problem, therefore, becomes one of determining whether an
independent act has been committed, or an event has occurred, previous
to the actual loss, which is, of itself, able to bear the entire "blame" for
10 Schwehr v. Badalamenti, 14 111. App.2d 128, 143 N.E.2d 558 (1957); Hill v. Alex-
ander, 321 Ill. App. 406, 53 N.E.2d 307 (1944); Sauter v. Anderson, 112 111. App. 580(1903).
11 141 111. 447, 31 N.E. 425 (1892).
12 115 Ill. App. 257 (1904), affm'd 215 111. 369, 74 N.E. 400 (1905).
1'3 Ill. App.2d 112, 120 N.E.2d 381 (1957).
14 Jack v. Prosperity Globe, 147 Ill. App. 176 (1909); Munz v. People, 90 Ill. App. 647
(1900); Kennedy v. Whittaker, 81111. App. 605 (1898). Thus, in Spousta v. Berger, 231
I11. App. 454 (1923), plaintiff's husband, while intoxicated, forged an order for the pay-
ment of money to secure liquor. Intoxication was deemed the cause of his conviction
and imprisonment for such crime, with resultant loss of support.
CASE NOTES
such loss. If such independent act is discovered, intoxication is removed
from the realm of proximate cause. A finding in favor of plaintiff, on the
other hand, will indicate a dependent intervening act or occurrence.
In the topic-case of this note, Kirulik v. Cohn, the situation is unique-
an act by plaintiff's own hand is the vital intervening cause, or more clear-
ly stated, the immediate cause of injury resulting in loss of support.
Defendants, therefore, founded their theory on the principle that no per-
son can profit by his own wrongdoing. They would deny recovery to a
person who has contributed in a material and substantial degree to his own
injury. Also, in their opinion, a party who shoots her husband is not an
"innocent suitor" as required by the courts in applying the Dramshops
Act.
The main support for these contentions was the fact that plaintiff was
fully aware of her husband's conduct while intoxicated but made no
effort to destroy whiskey left on the pantry shelf or to leave the premises
or call for help, but instead, obtained and loaded a gun, which she held
behind her back for twenty minutes and then shot her husband.1 5 Cases
cited by defendants' counsel held that a person is not an "innocent suitor"
and cannot recover where deceased's wife could have deprived her hus-
band if liquor by breaking the jug or throwing out its contents and does
not do so, as she is a willing party to his conduct;16 or where the injured
person purchased liquor for his later assailant; 17 or where the injured
party is in a group, the members of which have been drinking, who has
been drinking herself and who remains with persons obviously intoxi-
cated;' 8 and where the plaintiff provokes the assault.' 9 Emphasis was
placed on the case of Reget v. Bell, in which the Illinois Supreme Court
declared:
It seems very plain, from the testimony, the plaintiff, now his widow, could
have deprived him of the use of this whiskey, had she been so inclined, by
breaking the jug, or throwing away its contents, whilst he was in bed. There
was nothing to prevent her from so doing, and if she Was not willing her hus-
band should drink the contents of the jug, it was very easy to have prevented
it.
We are bound to consider she was a willing party to the conduct of her
husband, and instrumental in bringing the loss upon herself. 20
15 Defendants' (appellants') brief at 23.
16 Reget v. Bell, 77 I11. 593 (1875).
'7 Swan v. Dilonardo, 5 Ill. App.2d 233, 124 N.E.2d 657 (1955); Douglas v. Athens
Market Corporation, 320 111. App. 40, 49 N.E.2d 834 (1943); Forsberg v. Around Town
Club, Inc., 316 111. App. 661, 45 N.E.2d 513 (1942); Hays v. Waite, 36 Ill. App. 397
(1890).
18 James v. Wicker, 309 111. App. 397, 33 N.E.2d 169 (1941).
19 Bowman v. O'Brien, 303 I11. App. 630, 25 N.E.2d 544 (1940).
2o Reget v. Bell, 77 111. 593, 595 (1875).
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Plaintiff therefore, defendants argued, was precluded from claiming as an
"innocent suitor" because she made no effort to destroy whiskey left on
the pantry shelf.
Also, plaintiff's failure to leave the premises, in defendants' opinion, in-
dicated her willingness to remain in a predicament which, in fact, she had
created by obtaining, loading and using the gun. Thus, they called for the
same conclusion as reached in Forsberg v. Around Town Club:
There was no restraint which prevented his leaving the restaurant .... He
appears to have been satisfied to remain in whatever predicament he now com-
plains he was forced into and in which he suffered his injuries . . . and as a
matter of law [he] should not recover.2l
None of the cases cited, however, was found to be directly on point, so
as to declare plaintiff not an "innocent suitor" as a matter of law.22 Evalu-
ation of plaintiff's actions was reserved to the jury. In upholding such
procedure, the Illinois Appellate court said:
[W]e think the jury could properly find that plaintiff shot in self-defense,
and we cannot say, therefore, that she was not an innocent suitor. Whether
she should have left the apartment while he was chasing her, or should have
called for help, were matters of defense. The same is true of the question
whether she provoked the tragic event by threatening to go with decedent if
he left the house for more whiskey. It is also a matter of defense whether her
finding and loading the revolver and holding it hidden from decedent for
twenty minutes before shooting him made her not an "innocent suitor." All
reasonable men might not agree on the answers to these questions. Some might
think that she may have feared to call for help or to leave the apartment unless
to go with him if he went out for drink, and she may have hidden the revolver
with a prudent hope that decedent would desist. . . . Furthermore, plaintiff
could reasonably fear harm if she disposed of decedent's liquor.23
In this manner, the appellate court sanctioned the trial court's theory of
solving this complicated case on the basis of either falling within or with-
out the "in consequence" phrase of the Dramshops Act. In other words,
favorable verdict and judgment for plaintiff in the trial court evidence an
important development in the history of the "in consequence" cases. Com-
mission of what was found by the jury to be an act of self-defense is the
proximate result of the actions of an intoxicated individual, and in turn is
the proximate cause of that individual's death. The act of self-defense links
21 Forsberg v. Around Town Club, Inc., 316 111. App. 661, 666, 45 N.E.2d 513, 515
(1942).
22 "She was an 'innocent suitor' if she shot her husband in self-defense and did not
help to bring about his habitual drunkeness or his drunken condition which brought
about his death." Kirulik v. Cohn, 16 I11. App.2d 385, 390, 148 N.E.2d 607, 609 (1958).
23 Ibid., at 391, 610.
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intoxication and death in the proximate cause-and-effect relationship nec-
essary to recovery.24
This case has enunciated no new theories or rules to be applied to Dram-
shops Act cases in the future. It has, however, demonstrated something
more valuable. A complicated problem stemming from a unique set of
facts has been resolved upon the basic principles of cause and effect. In
other words, the case of Kirulik v. Cohn is an indication of the logical ex-
treme to which the interpretation of the phrase "in consequence of" can
be drawn.
24 Instruction given to the jury as to the meaning of the term "proximate cause" di-
rected them to look for "that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, un-
broken by any other cause, produced the event. The consequences must be natural
and probable consequences as distinguished from a possible consequence." Abstract of
record, instruction 13 at 340.
EQUITY-LACK OF MUTUALITY OF REMEDY AT IN-
CEPTION OF CONTRACT HELD NO DEFENSE IN
ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Manilow was a purchaser of real estate. His agent, Gould, sued the
record title holders, the true beneficial owners, and their broker, for spe-
cific performance on a contract for the purchase of land. Manilow exe-
cuted to Gould a general power of attorney in 1948, and on numerous
occasions since then, Gould had entered into contracts for the purchases
of real property, executing the instruments in her own name but on behalf
of Manilow. In 1953, the beneficial owners authorized and directed their
broker to put the property in question up for sale. The broker and Mani-
low negotiated the terms of a contract for the purchase of this land. The
broker then obtained the signature of the record title holders and sub-
mitted the contract to Manilow who orally instructed Gould to sign her
name on his behalf. On many occasions since the contract has been signed,
Manilow repeated his affirmation of the contract, including the act of
filing suit in this case.
Defendants moved to dismiss upon the ground that the power of attor-
ney authorized Gould to contract in the name of Manilow and on his be-
half, and not in her own name. They argued that Manilow was not bound
by the contract because there was an absence of mutuality of remedy at
the inception which precludes recovery. The trial court sustained the mo-
tion to dismiss and Gould appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court
since a freehold was involved. The supreme court held that lack of
mutuality of remedy at the inception of a contract is no longer a defense
to a suit for specific performance. Gould v. Stelter, 14 Ill. 2d 376, 152
N.E. 2d 869 (1958).
